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ABSTRACT
Disengagement and disenchantment with the Parliamentary process is an important concern in to-
day’s Western democracies. Members of Parliament (MPs) in the UK are therefore seeking new
ways to engage with citizens, including being on digital platforms such as Twitter. In recent years,
nearly all (579 out of 650) MPs have created Twitter accounts, and have amassed huge followings
comparable to a sizable fraction of the country’s population. This paper seeks to shed light on this
phenomenon by examining the volume and nature of the interaction between MPs and citizens. We
find that although there is an information overload on MPs, attention on individual MPs is focused
during small time windows when something topical may be happening relating to them. MPs man-
age their interaction strategically, replying selectively to UK-based citizens and thereby serving in
their role as elected representatives, and using retweets to spread their party’s message. Most promis-
ingly, we find that Twitter opens up new avenues with substantial volumes of cross-party interaction,
between MPs of one party and citizens who support (follow) MPs of other parties.
1 Introduction
There has been much bemoaning the apparent decrease in political engagement amongst the electorate in western
democracies such as the UK [1]. Connecting elected representatives such as Members of Parliament (MPs) with voters
(especially young voters) is seen as a means to “revive democracy” [2] and recently there is much hope that online
methods such as Twitter will play a key role in this [3]. Yet, traditional scholarship on legislative studies has focused
mostly on the relationship between the Parliament and the Government, casting MPs in the core roles of legislation
and scrutiny of the Executive branch, neglecting the communication between citizens and their MPs [4].
In this paper, we are interested in characterising how engagement of democratic representatives with their citizens
is shaped by online platforms, more specifically Twitter. We focus on the UK, where a remarkable 579 out of 650
Members of Parliament (MPs) are active on Twitter. This represents a dramatic rise from just a few years back: only
in 2011, we had just 51 MPs “dipping their toes” in Twitter [5]. Now, however, these MPs, who represent a nation of
65 Million, have a collective following of 12.83 Million on Twitter (some of these users follow multiple MPs; the total
number of unique users following at least one MP is 4.28 Million.). Thus, Twitter appears to have become a platform
on which MPs can engage with a substantial number of citizens.
To frame the discussion, we consider the nearest offline equivalent for interaction between MPs and citizens – con-
stituency service. The traditional means by which this is done is for the elected representatives to hold open and private
meetings with those that elected them. In the UK, for example, MPs travel back to their constituencies, typically on
Thursdays, after the work of the Parliament is done, and hold ‘surgeries’ with their constituents. ‘Town hall’ meetings
in the USA serve a similar purpose. Constituents may also phone or email their MPs and members of Congress to let
them know their positions on key issues.
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To be sure, there are differences between engagement on Twitter and traditional constituency service. Twitter interac-
tion can be immediate and spontaneous, in contrast with scheduled surgeries. The public nature of Twitter renders it
unsuitable for constituency service requiring personal information. In our dataset in 1548 cases, MPs asked to move
away from public discussions on Twitter, asking constituents to make appointments at their surgeries, offering their
email addresses or asking the respondent to “DM” or “direct message” them. In a handful (≈ 10) of cases, both options
were offered1. These interactions represent over 7% of replies by MPs. Also, constituency service is usually seen as
MPs engaging with and serving those in the geographic area they represent. In the UK, there is even a strict parlia-
mentary protocol that MPs do not seek to intervene or act in matters raised by the constituents of other members [6].
On Twitter, however, it can be hard for MPs to tell the precise location of their correspondents, and the immediacy and
public nature of the medium may lead to interactions with non-constituents.
Despite such differences, both forms of communications hold the same promise: direct contact and engagement be-
tween elected officials and those they are supposed to represent. Therefore, we turn to the literature on constituency
service interactions for pointers on the nature of the discourse between citizens and UK MPs on Twitter. The traditional
view of psephologists has been that constituency service is worth only about 500 votes [7, 8], and thus, is insufficient
to make a difference in all but the closest of elections. [9, 10] talk about the ‘incumbency factor’ and the need for
MPs to develop this relationship in order to get re-elected. Thus, more than being a campaigning tool, engaging with
citizens can be seen as a mechanism for building relationships and achieving better representation.
Based on these considerations, we focus on a two-month period from Oct 1, 2017 to Nov 29, 2017, when there was no
election going on, and thereby seek to understand the usage of Twitter as a tool for everyday citizen engagement. The
period also encompasses times when Parliament was in session (requiring MPs to be away from their constituencies,
attending the House of Commons) and in recess2 (when MPs are free to return to their constituencies), and therefore
can be expected to cover both aspects of MP activities. We study the Tweets, Retweets and Replies of MPs towards
other users, as well as from other users towards MPs. Both groups are active, with the MPs and the citizens respectively
producing 178,121 and 2,339,898 Tweets, Retweets and Replies directed at each other.
The parallels and distinctions between engagement on Twitter and constituency work also drive our research questions:
Norton and Wood’s seminal study of British MPs’ constituency work in the 80s concluded that constituency service
can be extremely rewarding, although taxing, taking MPs close to “saturation point” [11]. Therefore it is natural to ask
whether Twitter imposes a burden on MPs. Given that any additional work would also likely take time away from other
duties of the MP, we also wish to understand how MPs manage whatever burden is imposed on them by their Twitter
presence. Following the typology of [12] who studied how MPs use constituency service to package themselves, we ask
whether MPs are using Twitter to prioritise helping constituency members, gaining personal visibility by highlighting
work they have done, for spreading the message of their party and party leaders, or for other purposes. Finally, we
are interested in identifying the tone of the conversation online. Given the tendency of Twitter as a polarising and
sometimes aggressive sphere [13, 14], we ask what the nature and tone of the conversation is, between MPs and
others. This discussion can be crystallised into the following research questions:
RQ-1 As a new and additional medium of citizen engagement, how much load does Twitter place on MPs, and how
does this load vary?
RQ-2 How do MPs manage the load imposed? Do they selectively prioritise certain forms of engagement or seek
external help (e.g., from their staff)?
RQ-3 What is the nature and tone of the conversations? Is Twitter a polarising sphere with echo chambers for each
party and side of the political spectrum? Is the tone civil or aggressive?
We find that attention to individual MPs varies dynamically: although there is a huge amount of information overload
during short periods of time which we term as “focus windows”, there is a significant amount of “churn” in the set of
MPs who are “in focus” at any given time. MPs strategically manage their relationship with their followers and this
information overload by balancing their different roles as representatives of their constituency and their party [12]:
They selectively reply to Twitter profiles in the UK and within their constituency region, fulfilling their representative
role, and use retweets as a mechanism to promote their image and spread the message of their party. Interestingly, we
find evidence of significant cross-party interaction, between citizens who support and follow MPs from one party, and
MPs from other parties. Thus, in an atmosphere of growing political divide in the UK (e.g., [15, 16]), Twitter seems
to offer ways to avoid the “echo chamber” behaviour which characterises much consumption of information about
politics online.
1One MP wrote: “@XX, If you follow me I’ll DM you or please email YY@ZZ and I will get back to you. Thanks, D”
2https://www.parliament.uk/about/faqs/house-of-commons-faqs/business-faq-page/recess-dates/
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1.1 Related Work
Earlier studies on the use of Twitter by UK politicians mostly relate to a period when such usage was in its infancy,
with a small fraction of MPs being regular users [5, 17, 18, 19]. Nevertheless, there were early indications that use
of Twitter was entering the mainstream of electoral campaigning and political communications generally. Although,
political tweets might not look like substantive contributions to the political discourse, they appear to have become an
increasingly integrated element of political communication in a ‘hybrid media system’ [20].
In earlier usage of Twitter, one-way communications (“broadcasting”) predominated [5, 17, 18], but participatory
communication through Twitter was seen to be emergent. It seemed to fit neatly into [21]’s concept of direct represen-
tation [18] and politicians talked about their use of Twitter in these terms, but it was still secondary to other uses [20].
Nevertheless, [18] found that 19% of candidates’ tweets during the 2010 general election campaign interacted in one
way or another with voters, which they argued was a fairly substantial level of interaction compared to other forms
of political communication during the campaign. A participatory style of communications on Twitter had potential to
earn legislators political capital [5] and was the only statistically significant strategy that had a positive impact on the
size of the community [17].
Cross-party communication between MPs was found to be unusual. Unsurprisingly, MPs indulged in one-off attacks
on other politicians during the 2010 UK general election campaign [18] but there was evidence of a more collaborative
approach amongst an “organic community” of early adopters on Twitter [5]. Supporters of different parties tended
to cluster around different hashtags during election campaigns, creating politically separated communication spaces
[20]. Here, we focus on communications between MPs and non-MPs during periods when there is no election, and
find that cross-party talk is more prevalent.
Our focus on a period without an election also makes our efforts complementary to the large number of works that
examine the (ab)use of Twitter during election campaigns [18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25]. Complementary to our focus on
MP efforts, [25] studies citizens’ participation in political discussions online, and finds that extrinsic motivations such
as social norms are the most significant in mobilising efforts.
2 Background and dataset
In this section, we give a background about the UK democratic process, focusing on MPs and their communication
needs and motivations, and describe the datasets3 we have collected to answer our questions.
2.1 MPs and Democracy in the UK
The Parliament in Westminster is the supreme legislature in the UK. It is composed of two houses or chambers. The
primary house is the House of Commons. It has 650 elected members. Most MPs at any given election are drawn from
a handful of major political parties. It is possible for candidates to run for election without the backing of a political
party but they are very unlikely to get elected. The three major parties in the UK Parliament following the 2017 general
election were Conservative (Cons.), Labour (Lab.) and Scottish National Party (SNP). Other parties with MPs include
the Liberal Democrats (Lib Dems) and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP).
Members of Parliament are elected on a “party ticket” or manifesto and when they vote in the House of Commons
they are expected to obey party discipline. This also applies to their publicity and engagement work, where they are
discouraged from giving messages that are inconsistent with the party line. This role of the MP as a party representative
may sometimes conflict with the role of MPs as representatives of their constituencies. However, some MPs are more
loyal to their party than others [26], and in some cases, may choose constituency over party.
2.2 Datasets
MPs on Twitter We start with the MPs who are active on Twitter, as obtained from a comprehensive and up to date
list4. The UK House of Commons has 650 Members of Parliament (MPs). Of these, 5795 MPs (187, i.e., 32.37% are
female) are active on Twitter, with a total of ≈ 13 Million followers. For each MP, we obtained the following data:
Follower and Following Using twitter API, we fetched all the users (≈ 4.28 Million) who follow MPs and also the
users that MPs followed (869K).
3The dataset we collected is made available at https://nms.kcl.ac.uk/netsys/datasets/tweeting-mps/ for non-commercial research usage. Following Twitter’s Terms of
Usage (https://twitter.com/en/tos), we will only be able to share the Tweet IDs.
4http://www.mpsontwitter.co.uk/list
5we have collected data for 559 MPs since last year, and have not included the 20 new MPs who have joined since then.
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MPs on Twitter 559
Verified MPs 83.54%
Total Followers 12.83 Million
Mentions per MP per
day (⇐)
Mean: 67.96,
Median: 13.25,
Standard Deviation: 302.82
Activity (Tweets, replies
to others) per MP per day
(⇒)
Mean: 5.52,
Median: 3.3,
Standard Deviation: 6.18
Table 1: Details of the Twitter dataset (Oct 1 – Nov 30 2017).
Tweets and replies (⇒) Using the Twitter API, we obtain from the MPs’ Twitter timelines a total of up to 3,200
original tweets, retweets and replies to other Twitter handles.This covers the period of Oct 1 - Nov 30 2017,
and we are able to fetch all MPs’ timelines within the maximum limit of 3,200 allowed by Twitter. These
collectively identify the utterances made by the MPs, directed towards other Twitter users. We will use the
symbol⇒ to refer to such Tweets.
Mentions and replies to MPs (⇐) To fully understand the extent of the conversation, we obtain the utterances of all
other Twitter users6, directed towards the MPs. This is obtained by searching for the MPs’ Twitter handles
using Twitter’s “advanced search” API, and includes all mentions of the MPs’ Twitter handles, whether as a
reply to a tweet of an MP, or merely mentioning an MP’s Twitter user name in a non-reply Tweet. We will
use the symbol⇐ to refer to such Tweets.
Collectively,⇒ and⇐ capture both sides of the conversation between MPs with Twitter handles and the rest of Twitter.
To understand how people talk about MPs who are not on Twitter, we searched for the full (first and last) names of such
MPs, obtaining 35,904 Tweets. To ensure that this refers to MPs and not some other person with the same name, we
manually examined all Tweets and compiled a list of the most politically related words used in conjunction with these
names (mp, Brexit, Parliament, Westminster, Tory, Minister, Party, Conservative,
Labour, Vote, Democracy). Filtering for these keywords, we are able to retain 15,083 (of the 35,904) Tweets.
Since these are Tweets mentioning MP names, we term these as “pseudo-mentions”. Clearly we are conservative in
capturing pseudo mentions, and may have ignored several tweets, e.g., those that may not use the first and last names
of the MPs. However, pseudo-mentions introduce data about 67 MPs. Thus, information about 646 of the 650 MPs are
captured in our dataset, in one way or another. Statistics about the dataset are listed in Table 1.
We also perform additional heuristic processing to obtain the following information for MPs and all users who mention
them or are mentioned by the MPs (through retweets, replies or original tweets). Where heuristics may lead to errors,
we try to perform some checks, using limited ground truth to give some indication of the accuracy or coverage that we
believe we have attained:
Geography We assign country-level labels for each user as follows: Fetching the profile location of users, and check-
ing for words such as UK, London, England, Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland, United Kingdom, we labeled
around half of the users. For the remaining ones, the unique list of their locations is passed to Photon library’s
geocode function7, an open street API to label countries given location names (e.g., city/locality/state etc.)
that a user might have used. Using this procedure, the countries of ≈ 82.7% (77.3%) of users retweeted
(replied to) by MPs were obtained.
For users in the UK, we dig deeper. A Twitter profile location may mention only a city name (such as ‘Cam-
bridge, UK’), rather than a specific constituency (such as ‘Cambridge South’, which contains a small part
of the City of Cambridge and close-by villages). Also, citizens may work in one constituency and reside
in another which is close by. Thus, to identify interactions between a user and their local MP, we trans-
late user locations to the ‘postcode area’ which represents the region (e.g., ‘CB’ represents Cambridge in
Cambridge-related postcodes), and consider all interactions between users from that postcode area, and the
MPs representing that postcode as interactions between MP and a potential constituent.
Party affiliation For every user who has mentioned an MP, we associate the party affiliation of the MP with the user.
Users have mentioned a mean (median) of 3 (2) MPs, from an average (median) of 2 (1) parties. We affiliate
each user with one party. For users who have mentioned MPs from more than one party, we assign them
the party they have mentioned the most. Check: By checking for the presence of party names in the profile
6In the rest of this paper, we interchangeably use the terms “ordinary” Twitter users and “citizen” to refer users who have mentioned an MP in one of their Tweets.
When the term citizen is used, it has been verified (if relevant), that the users included are those who declare a profile location in the UK (See Geography details above).
7http://photon.komoot.de/
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description amongst a sample of ≈ 8K Conservative and Labour supporters, we are able to correctly label
nearly 7,400, yielding a 91.4% accuracy for our heuristic.
3 Dynamics of Citizen Attention
In this section, we approach the first research question, and estimate the burden caused to MPs by their Twitter pres-
ence, by studying tweets directed towards MPs by other Twitter users. Our starting point is the stark difference in
Table 1 between the number of mentions that an MP gets (marked as⇐), and the average number of tweets and reply
activities made by them (marked as⇒). This suggests that MPs could be overloaded, and are not able to respond to
all tweets directed at them.
To examine this, we introduce metrics that measure the spread of attention load, in terms of mentions of MPs. We study
the distribution of attention across time for any individual MP, and across all MPs during any given time window. We
find that in any given time window, a small number of MPs are ‘in focus’, and receive a large number of mentions.
However, as the news cycle moves on, other MPs’ activities come into focus. We then illustrate this phenomenon using
examples and discuss the implications.
3.1 Attention is focused during small time windows
To understand how overloaded the MPs are with the number of mentions they receive, we first examine high activity
periods. We define a period of high activity as a continuous sequence of days when the daily activity is considered as
‘high’. Formally, given an MP i and a threshold average number of mentions Ti, we define a continuous sequence of
days R as a high activity window for MP i if it satisfies the property
high_activityi(R) :
∑
d∈R
vid > Ti|R|
where vid is the number of mentions obtained by MP i on day d. In this paper, we set the threshold for a high activity
individually for each MP. A day qualifies as a ‘high activity’ day for an MP if the number of mentions received by
the MP that day is higher than the personal average for that MP8. Note that even if MPs only receive a large number
of tweets during a short time window, this will increase their personal average for the whole 2 month duration of our
data set. We term the longest continuous run of days during which an MP i has more than his or her personal average
number of Tweets mentioning them – as their focus window Tmaxi . We can compute the fraction F (T ) of MP i’s
mentions that are obtained during a time window T as
F (T ) =
1
Vi
∑
d∈T
vid.
Here, Vi is the total volume of Tweets mentioning MP i in our dataset, and vid is the number of mentions obtained on
day d in the window T . We define the Focus of MP i as the fraction of mentions Fi = F (Tmaxi ) obtained during the
focus window Tmaxi . In other words, Focus measures what fraction of an MP’s mentions during the whole 2 months
period covered by our data set is concentrated during the small Focus Window, i.e., the longest continuous sequence
of days during which the MP receives a higher than average number of Tweets.
Figure 1a shows the distribution of Focus values for all MPs. For comparison, the fraction of mentions F (T bi ) and
F (T ai ) during similar-sized windows before and after the focus window is also shown. Mentions tend to fall off
rapidly outside focus windows: in the windows immediately preceding (following) these periods of intense activity,
MPs on average receive less than a quarter of the tweets received during the high activity focus window.
By definition, Focus takes values between 0 and 1. We can get a sense of how skewed focus values are by normalising
the obtained focus based on the expected fraction of mentions given the size of the focus window: if the Vi mentions
are evenly across a total of D days, the number of mentions expected in a focus window of |R| days is simply |R|/D.
The observed Focus Fi can therefore be normalised as FiD/|R|. If mentions are uniformly distributed, normalised
focus would be ≈ 1. Figure 1b shows that this value tends to be several times larger than 1, suggesting that a dispro-
portionately large fraction of the mentions for an MP might come during their one concentrated focus period. In other
words, MPs are in the limelight only for a short period of time. Empirically, we find that the focus window period
typically lasts between 3–5 days.
8Other threshold definitions were examined, but not reported here due to space.
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(a) Focus (b) Normalised Focus
(c) Churn (d) Gini
Figure 1: The distribution of (a) Focus of MPs’ mentions: cumulative distribution of unnormalised fraction of mentions
F (Tmaxi ) obtained by MPs during their focus windows. For comparison, the (much smaller) fractions of mentions
F (T bi ) and F (T
a
i ) of windows just before and after the focus windows is shown. (b) Cumulative distribution of
Focus, normalised to yield a Focus of 1 if mentions were distributed evenly. Most of the mass is several times over 1,
confirming high information overload during focus windows. (c) Churn: Box plots of the distribution of Churn values
across time windows of different sizes. The box extends from the lower to upper quartile values of the data, with a line
at the median. The mean is shown as a green dot. Whiskers extend from the box to show the range. Flier points are
outliers past the end of the whiskers. (d) Gini: Box plot of distribution of Gini co-efficients of the number of mentions
received by MPs during time windows of different sizes.
3.2 Attention is unequal but focus moves among MPs
The previous discussion suggests that MPs receive mentions in a very bursty manner: Outside their focus window,
an individual MP contributes much less to the overall volume of mentions directed towards MPs. Yet, as seen earlier,
there is an average daily volume amounting to about 68 mentions per MP. In this subsection, we look at how mentions
are shared among the MPs on a daily basis.
We proceed by considering all possible time windows of different sizes from 1–10 days. For instance, we can have
5-day windows from Oct 1–5, Oct 2–6 . . . Nov 24–29. Our goal is to understand the effect of MPs not receiving many
mentions outside their focus windows and how mentions are shared during any given window.
For any time window of a given size, we ask how many of the high activity MPs of that window – MPs who receive
more than their personal average number of mentions – continue to receive high numbers of mentions in the next
window. Formally, we define the set of active MPs during a time window R as
active(R) = {i|high_activityi(R)}.
We can define the churn of a time window R and the time window R+ immediately following it as the difference in
the set of active users between the two windows:
Churn(R) =
|active(R)4active(R+)|
|active(R) ∪ active(R+)|
where the numerator is the symmetric set difference of MPs who are active in time window R but not R+ and vice
versa, and the denominator is the union of users in the time windows. Figure 1c shows that churn is high: Nearly
70% of MPs who receive more than their personal average of mentions during one window are not able to sustain this
level of activity in the next window. Churn increases slightly as window sizes increase, with MPs finding it difficult to
continuously receive high numbers of mentions over larger time windows.
While churn looks at differences across time windows, we can also measure how unequal the attention distribution
is within a time window, by counting the number of mentions each MP receives during the window and computing
6
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Figure 2: Timeline of number of mentions for 50 MPs who have more than half their mentions occur during their focus
window.
the gini co-efficient across all MPs receiving mentions. Gini co-efficients vary between 0.8 and 0.92, and the closer
it is to 1, the more unequal the distribution being measured. We can get a sense of the inequality for different time
windows of a given size by looking at the distribution of Gini co-efficients. Figure 1d shows the distributions of gini
co-efficients for time windows of different sizes. The median gini co-efficient for all window sizes is consistently
above 0.8, indicating that in any single window, most of the mentions are for a small minority of “attention rich” MPs.
Collectively, these results suggest that during any given window, a few MPs are attention rich and receive a large
number of mentions, but this set of MPs shifts over a period of days, so there are no overall “superstars” who are
always at the centre of attention. The examples below serve to illustrate this phenomenon.
3.3 Examples and implications
To better visualise the attention imbalance, Fig. 2 plots the daily mentions volumes of 50 MPs with the highest focus.
The focus values for each of these MPs is more than 0.5; i.e., more than half of their mentions were received during
their focus windows. The spiky nature of the graph illustrates how attention can be highly concentrated during short
focus windows (typically 3–5 days), and moves on to other MPs after the focus period.
Priti Patel (@patel4witham) represents an interesting example: She was International Development Minister until 8
Nov 2017, but was forced to resign as a result of a scandal caused by unofficial meetings with Israeli ministers while
on a holiday in that country. This resulted in a barrage of focused attention which fizzled out as other new stories
cropped up. Similarly, Philip Hammond (@PhilipHammondUK), Chancellor of the Exchequer, had a huge number of
mentions around the Autumn Budget (22 Nov 2017). Note that there is a smaller spike for Hammond just before the
budget when he mistakenly claimed in an interview that there are no unemployed in the UK9.
These two examples illustrate two different kinds of focus windows: The attention towards Priti Patel was completely
unanticipated until the event unfolded, whereas the increased attention towards Philip Hammond as he presented the
budget was predictable and could have been anticipated and planned for (although even here, unanticipated mistakes
can create spikes, as in Hammond’s case).
Anticipated attention is mostly for positive events and is in many cases “manufactured” by the MPs, their staff and
members of their party, following prominent speeches or comments made in Parliament, as such successes are adver-
tised by sharing widely on Twitter. A common source for such high attention events is activity during Prime Minster’s
Questions, which happens every single Wednesday at noon when the House of Commons is in session, and usually
involves a lively and sometimes raucous debate. When an MP makes a particularly valuable (or sometimes particularly
witty) contribution, it is shared by the MPs themselves, or by others, on Twitter, and then gets widely discussed.
9https://www.theguardian.com/politics/video/2017/nov/19/philip-hammond-there-are-no-unemployed-in-uk-andrew-marr-show-video
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Geography %Mentions
⇐
%Retweet
⇒
%Reply
⇒
UK
(Constituency (C))
74.16
(C:28.8)
90.39
(C:56.7)
89.93
(C:59.04)
Commonwealth 3.88 2.35 1.74
USA 5.34 3.42 4.63
EU 3.47 2.53 1.72
Others 13.15 1.29 2.06
Total 100% 100% 100%
Table 2: Geographic Distribution of incoming mentions (⇐) and outgoing actions (⇒) in different geographical re-
gions. Each column adds up to a whole (i.e., UK + Commonwealth (British Commonwealth and Overseas Territories)
+ USA + EU + Others = 100%). UK replies are further subdivided into replies within the constituency region of the
MP, and those outside (The percentage local to MPs’ constituency regions is shown in parenthesis as C:XX.YY%).
Thus, for instance, from (Row 1, Col 1), 74.16% of all incoming (⇐) mentions towards an MP come from within
the UK. Of these, 28.8% of mentions are from within each MP’s constituency, and the remaining (71.2%) are from
outside their constituencies.
By contrast, unanticipated focus windows, as with Priti Patel, include mostly negative events for the MP. For instance,
during the Westminster sex scandal, Charlie Elphicke (@CharlieElphicke), a Conservative MP, was accused of sex-
ual misconduct and subsequently suspended from his party. The Westminster sex scandal, which coincided with the
’#MeToo’ movement, includes several other resignations and castigations which also received high attention and focus
values. Similarly, Labour MP Harriet Harman (@HarrietHarman) was criticised for mentioning an anti-semitic joke
on live TV.
The focus windows of 70% (35/50) of the MPs in Fig. 2 are for events that could have been anticipated. However,
perhaps unsurprisingly, unanticipated windows receive unusually high attention – four of the top five focus windows are
apparently unanticipated, and for events which generated considerable adverse publicity. Thus, unanticipated attention
can be all the more difficult to manage because of the volumes. Furthermore, all of the top five focus values are for
MPs from the Conservative Party, which, as the current ruling party, tends to receive a large amount of scrutiny. Four
of these also had ministerial level roles at one point or another and another held a senior role within the party. The fact
that even such prominent MPs obtain more than half of their mentions during a small 3–5 day focus period illustrates
that the attention of citizens is highly volatile and all too brief.
Focus periods represent opportunities for the MPs to raise their profile and engage with the populace on issues im-
portant to the MP. Whether the focus is a result of a positive event that the MP can take advantage of, or a negative
event the MP should defend against, being able to appropriately handle the situation and manage the (brief) attention
overload is critical. The next section looks at strategies that MPs use to manage citizens’ attention both during their
focus periods and out of their focus periods.
4 Managing citizens’ attention
Incoming Tweets mentioning MPs (marked as ⇐ in Table 1) can be seen as a means for UK citizens and other
Twitterati to engage with the MPs. In the previous section, we established that MPs faced an information overload
with incoming tweets, especially during focus windows. In this section, we turn to the second research question, and
ask how MPs manage this attention load in responding back, i.e., we also take into account the MPs’ outgoing Tweets
(marked⇒) in terms of Tweets, Retweets and Replies, and ask how MPs engage with the rest of Twitter.
We identify two possible adaptations: The first consists of very selective replies, with MPs prioritising interactions
with users local to their constituency region. The second is to employ staff who can help manage the load. We find
extensive usage of the first strategy, with MPs largely prioritising their responses to users local to their region and
to UK users. However, only some MPs appear to be using additional staff who can help manage their social media
profiles.
4.1 Selective replies and localism in MP actions
MPs tend to be very busy, and being active online takes time away from their other duties, and their real-world
constituency [27]. Therefore, we expect that MPs would be selective in who they respond to (even during non-focus
periods). We test this hypothesis in two ways. First, we check the geographic areas of those whom the MPs respond
to. Next, we check the category of the Twitter handles they respond to – whether they are responding to other MPs, or
those that they follow or are following them.
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Figure 3: MP responses (retweets and replies) put into mutually exclusive categories. A ‘Self’ response is a retweet or
reply to MP’s own tweet or reply. ‘Mentioned’ is a response to a tweet mentioning the MP. ‘Following’ is a response to
a tweet which does not mention the MP but appears on their timeline because the MP follows the person. ‘Protected’
tweets and replies are not available to analyse. ‘Others’ comprises the remainder of retweets and replies.
Table 2 shows the percentage distribution of the incoming mentions (⇐) and outgoing actions (⇒) – replies and
retweets, among different geographic regions. In their conversations with Twitter users not from the UK, MPs tend
to favour responding to Twitter users from countries that the UK has ties with: USA (5.3% mentions, 3.4% retweets,
4.6% replies), British commonwealth and Overseas Territories (3.8% mentions, 2.3% retweets, 1.7% replies) and the
EU (3.4% mentions, 2.5% retweets, 1.7% replies). Other countries get only 2% of retweets or replies although they
author over 13% of tweets mentioning MPs.
As expected, a large fraction of mentions (≈ 75%) come from the UK, but MPs show selectivity, with over ≈ 90%
of their retweets and replies being made to UK-based Twitter users. This suggests that Twitter is serving as a way for
MPs to keep in touch with the UK electorate. MPs are even more responsive to Tweets from within their constituency
(identified as mentioned in the Dataset section). As shown in parenthesis in Table 2, among incoming (⇐) Tweets
from within the UK that mention MPs, only about 28.8% come from within the constituency region. However, MPs’
outgoing (⇒) tweets prioritise interactions with such local tweets: 56.7% of retweets, and nearly 60% of replies are
focussed within the constituency region represented by the MP10.
We then compare the responses – replies and retweets – sent to different categories of people. Focusing first on the
replies, Fig. 3 shows that ≈43% of replies are to tweets that mention the MP directly; thus MPs are using their replies
to engage directly in conversation with those that mention them on Twitter. In contrast to replies, most (57.8%) of
the retweets are for those that the MP follows. In other words, MPs are retweeting other users even without the MP
being mentioned. This is not surprising, since Tweets from those that MPs follow appear on MPs’ timeline, and MPs
may retweet what they find interesting. However, a disproportionate number of retweets are tweets of other MPs, and
in particular, MPs from the same party: on average, other MPs constitute 7.4% of the following numbers of an MP.
However, nearly 17% of all retweet actions are made on Tweets of other MPs. A further 6% of retweets are for posts
made by their party’s official Twitter handle. Nearly 96% of the MP-MP retweets are for MPs from the same party.
Thus, it appears that MPs are using retweets as political marketing, to boost their party’s message (termed as party
maintenance by [12]).
Figure. 3 also shows that a small but significant minority of replies (9.4%) are from the MP to themselves. This
turns out to mostly be Tweetstorms – a single post which has been split into series of related tweets (posted in quick
succession) because of Twitter’s character limit. On Nov 7 2017, close to the midpoint of our data collection period
(Oct 1–Nov 29), Twitter did expand the character limit from 140 to 280, but this hardly affected the volume of self-
replies: Prior to Nov 7, there was an average of 36.02 self-replies per day from all MPs, and after this date, the average
was 34.17 per day. Thus, it appears that in many cases, MPs need a larger text limit than 280 characters to discuss
substantive topics.
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Figure 4: MPs’ outgoing (⇒) activity by day of week and Twitter client used. The ‘row bar’ on right side and ‘col
line’ on top represents the counts of total data by Twitter client and day of week respectively. Dark blue represents the
lowest activity and dark red the highest. Lowest activity is found trivially on Saturdays and Sundays and the highest
activity is on Wednesdays, corresponding to Prime Minister’s Questions. Android, iPhone and iPad clients are the most
popular.
4.2 Help from Staff?
The previous subsection identified selective responses and prioritisation of constituents as one way for MPs to cope
with the load of engaging on Twitter. As an alternate or complementary strategy, MPs may also employ staff desig-
nated as Communications Officer or Senior Communications Officer. Permitted (non-party political) activities of such
staff include establishing a social media presence in the constituency, publicising surgeries, following up on social
media queries and comments, publicising the MP’s parliamentary duties on social media and proactive and reactive
communications with all media [28].
We cannot determine with certainty which tweeting instances originate from MPs and which from their staff, but
we can find suggestive evidence. For instance, if multiple people are managing an account, it has the potential to
be detected as a bot by the Botometer tool [29, 30]. Only 45 of the 559 MPs (≈ 8%) in our data are detected as
bots by this API11. We can also look at the Twitter client(s) used, as identified by the ‘statusSource’ field of Tweets
collected from the MPs’ handles. A total of 47 different sources are used by the 559 MPs, ranging from the Twitter Web
Client and TweetDeck, to Twitter for iPhone or Android. Fig. 4 shows that posting activity is mainly through the Web,
whereas replies and retweets happen through personal devices such as iphone or android smartphones. Web clients can
potentially come from multiple computers belonging to different staff. We also find that MP Twitter handles which
use iPhone do not tend to also use android, and vice versa. Furthermore, the Web Clients are active mainly during
weekdays. These patterns are suggestive of the MPs themselves, or one selected member of their staff handling the
responses (replies and retweets), with the possibility of multiple staff being delegated the duty of posting new tweets,
which may consist of advertising the MPs’ activities; sharing videos and transcripts of their speeches etc. Note that
the highest activity for the Web Client is on Wednesday, corresponding to Prime Minister’s Questions, which, as
mentioned before, is a highly advertised and popular activity. We also find that for over half the MPs, more than 80%
of their replies and retweets come from one source (Fig. 5), which is further indicative of one person managing their
Twitter presence.
These observations can potentially be explained by the rule that MPs may not claim for party political and campaigning
activities [28]. Some activities identified above, such as retweeting their party position, may not be allowable due to
this rule, and would therefore need to be undertaken by the MP rather than their staff. This hypothesis is in alignment
with our finding in Fig. 5 that posts (original Tweets by MPs) are more likely to come from multiple sources than
retweets – recall that posts tend to advertise MPs’ parliamentary duties such as speeches and remarks made in the
House of Commons, whereas retweets tend to amplify messages of other party members or the official party handle.
10Note that this analysis only includes the 78% of Tweets for which we are able to extract a valid geographic location of the Twitter profile with whom an MP is
corresponding. We also conservatively remove 60 London-based MPs from consideration because most MPs interact with journalists, lobbyists etc., who tend to be
based around London. London MPs therefore appear to have an even higher localisation factor, with nearly all their responses to users within their region.
11https://osome.iuni.iu.edu/
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Figure 5: Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of the fraction of an MP’s activity which is captured by their most
commonly used source. For over half the MPs, more than 70% of their original tweets (posts), and 80–90% of their
retweets and replies come from one source, which could imply one person managing their handle.
Figure 6: Cross-party conversations in ⇐ Fraction of mentions from citizens who support (follow) MPs from one
party to MPs of other parties. Each row adds up to 1, including mentions from citizens to MPs of their own party.
MPs are also more likely to spend their limited budgets on communications staff only if certain conditions are met, for
example MPs who are more junior and need to advertise themselves, or are in marginal seats [31].
5 Tone of political discussion
Finally, we move to the third research question, and inquire about the nature and tone of the Twitter conversations. We
are motivated to understand whether this platform, which appears to have gone mainstream in just five years since the
first studies, and is being widely used by nearly all MPs, is contributing positively to the political debate.
This is an important question to answer, as various events such as Brexit have led to a highly charged and polarised
political atmosphere in the UK, and both scholars and broadsheet newspapers have argued that the “middle has fallen
out” of UK Politics [15, 16, 32, 33]. There is also wide concern that political discussion on Twitter involves aggressive
and “trashy” language [14, 34].
Given the large scale of our data, we take a broad-brush approach, and focus on understanding whether there is cross-
party political discussion between MPs and citizens, and on the tone and sentiments of the discussion as discoverable
by tools such as LIWC 2015 [35].
Figure 7: Cross-party conversations in⇒ Fraction of MPs from one party replying to citizens who follow (support)
MPs of other parties. Each row adds up to 1, including replies from MPs to citizens of their own party.
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Figure 8: LIWC scores for variables or categories reported by LIWC. Scores are normalised by dividing by the base
rate scores expected by LIWC 13 if score is greater (resp. less) than 1, as marked by the horizontal dotted line, LIWC
score is more (resp. less) than base rate. Corpus of⇐ tweets mentioning MP names is marked white;⇒ tweets from
MPs to citizens are marked gray. A category is marked in red (resp. orange) if the score for⇐ (resp.⇒) is 50% more
than for⇒ (resp.⇐) corpus.
5.1 Cross-party political conversations
To quantify polarisation, we divide users based on the party they support (using the method specified in the dataset
section), and ask the extent to which they interact with MPs of other parties. Our focus on communications between
people in power (MPs) and ordinary citizens distinguishes us from previous work that looked at how ordinary users
have polarised [14, 36, 37, 38]. Additionally, the UK is a multi-party system, which provides an interesting differ-
entiating dimension to prior work, which has typically looked at a two-way polarisation, focusing on two sides of a
conflict [36, 38], or on two-party systems like the USA [14, 37].
In Figure 6, we examine Tweets from UK users that mention MPs, and find that regardless of the party they support,
there is a lot of cross-party talk. Specifically, we focus on the top five parties in terms of MP numbers, and find
that supporters of all parties tend to tweet mentioning MPs of the Conservative party, which is currently in power.
Exploration with LDA topic modelling (not discussed in the paper) suggests that citizens are interested in topics such
as the budget, Brexit, and resignations of ministers (due to scandals during the period of our collection). All of these
have a natural focus on ministers and MPs of the governing party, which helps explain the surprising amount of cross-
party mentions. Conservative supporters have the largest proportion of within-party mentions (69.8%). This suggests
that users’ Tweets are directed at topical and current issues, and people involved in those issues, rather than the MPs
they follow and the party they support, indicating a healthy attitude of engagement beyond the “echo chamber” of
people who have similar views in online conversations .
An extreme example of cross-party conversation is the case of the Liberal Democrats (Lib Dems), whose supporters
have more mentions of Conservative MPs than the 12 sitting MPs whose Twitter accounts they follow (Fig. 6). In turn,
Lib Dem MPs talk more to Labour supporters (who are more numerous) than those that follow them (Fig. 7). A similar
discrepancy between the interests of the MPs and its party supporters is observed with MPs of the Scottish National
Party (SNP), whose replies have a greater proportion of replies to Labour supporters than conservative supporters,
whereas ordinary citizens who follow SNP MPs talk more with conservative MPs than to Labour MPs. SNP and Lib
Dems are ideologically closer to Labour than the Conservative Party12. We therefore conjecture that the discrepancy
may be caused by MPs replying to those of a similar ideology as them, whereas citizens, who take a more questioning
attitude (see next section), are engaging directly with the opposing view of the Conservatives.
12https://yougov.co.uk/news/2014/07/23/britains-changing-political-spectrum/, https://www.politicalcompass.org/uk2017
13http://liwc.wpengine.com/compare-dictionaries/
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Dimension Difference Dimension Difference
Swear 90.5% Nonflu 63.2%
QMark 79.2% Shehe 63.2%
Filler 78.4% Anger 58.2%
Exclam 72.2% Leisure 58.1%
Negate 66.4% Male 56.6%
Table 3: LIWC categories which make it less likely that MPs respond back to citizen. This table shows the percentage
difference of some LIWC dimensions that corresponds to the decreased likelihood of MPs in making responses to
incoming (⇐) mentions if these LIWC categories are present.
5.2 Language and sentiments
Given the surprising result of substantial cross-party talk between MPs and users, it is natural to ask what the tone of
the conversation is between MPs and citizens – i.e., whether the discussion between MPs and citizens is a civilised
discussion or an aggressive slanging match as in recent political campaigns [34]. To measure this, we use LIWC to
summarise the language of the citizens mentioning MPs (⇐) on the one hand, and MPs replies to citizens’ Tweets (⇒)
on the other. We look for differences and similarities in language usage between these two categories, to understand
the tone of the discourse between MPs and citizens.
LIWC provides 94 dimensions along which to measure different aspects of language use [35]. For each dimension, it
also gives the base rates of word counts to be expected in normal usage. Fig. 8 shows the LIWC scores obtained for
each dimension of language use, for both ⇐ and ⇒, normalised by the expected base rates of usage of that dimension.
To take a principled approach, we focus on the LIWC categories which see higher than base rates of usage or where
there is substantial (> 50%) difference between ⇐ and ⇒. Using this approach, we can make the following obser-
vations from Fig. 8:
1. Both MPs and citizens show more positive emotions than LIWC base rates, which could be suggestive of a
respectful or appreciative discussion.
2. However, citizens’ incoming (⇐) Tweets also express more than the base rate of negative emotion, anxiety
and anger, suggesting more conflict in some conversations. The citizens’ Tweets also raise a lot of ques-
tions, heavily using interrogatives, and question marks in their language. This could potentially be related to
scandals and related resignations during the period of study.
3. Unusually for political conversations, there is a large amount of sexual and sex-related words, owing to the
Westminster sex scandal which erupted in the wake of the #MeToo movement, and led to the resignation of
several ministers and MPs during the period of our study14.
4. Perhaps because of this scandal, citizens’ incoming (⇐) tweets towards MPs have a higher than base rate
of “moralising” language, using words such as ‘should’, ‘would’ (marked as discrep), and ‘always’, ‘never’
(marked as certain).
5. Words relating to power and risk figure highly in the MPs’ language as well as the citizens’.
Table 3 shows that MPs appear to take into consideration the language of a mention in deciding whether to reply back.
Incoming (⇐) mentions from citizens which exhibit anger or use swear words, question marks, filler words and other
non-fluencies (e.g., “err”, “um”, I mean, you know, etc...) are less likely to elicit a reply.
Our broad-brush approach is intended only to provide a flavour of the tone of discussion. It appears to indicate that in
our study period, which was rich in scandals that affected multiple MPs and ministers, citizens are using Twitter as a
platform to freely and directly question their representatives and express negative emotions, anxiety and anger, as they
are entitled to. However, they also show higher than base rates of positive affect and appreciation where warranted.
In return, MPs appear to exercise restraint, using higher than base rates of positive language, and avoiding using or
responding to negative language (which could escalate conflict). We conjecture that the public nature of Twitter leads
to MPs being conscious of the effect of their words on their image and public perception, providing a platform for
civilised discourse. We note that this kind of behaviour may be partly due to our focus on interactions between MPs
and citizens. Previous studies in the UK context have found that MPs have indulged in attacks on other politicians,
especially in election contexts [18].
14Wikipedia provides the most up to date account at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2017_Westminster_sexual_scandals. Sky News also has a
useful timeline of one of the most intense weeks: https://news.sky.com/story/a-week-in-westminster-sex-scandal-timeline-11111086
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6 A possible future of online Twitter engagement
We conclude with a brief case study of a novel way in which the immediacy of Twitter was used to improve democracy
by allowing citizens a part in creating an Act of Parliament, and discuss how it speaks to our three research questions:
Individual MPs in the UK Parliament are able to submit Bills (also known as draft legislation). These are known as
Private Members’ Bills. Priority is given to Government-sponsored Bills, so to ensure that a proportion of Private
Members’ Bills have a chance to become law, there is a ballot of MPs each year to assign priority for the limited
amount of debating time available. However, even Bills coming high up in the ballot are unlikely to be passed unless
they have the tacit or explicit support of the Government.
Chris Bryant, a Labour back bench MP, came top in the ballot for the 2017-19 session, and therefore was eligible to
propose a Bill. However, as a member of the Opposition Party who is also not among the prominent “front bench”
MPs, his bill would have faced an uphill task. Bryant launched a consultation on Twitter in July 2017 (before our
study period), putting forward six possible Bills and asking Twitter users to choose their favourite through an online
survey. 45,000 people participated15, and the winner of the poll was a proposal to provide additional legal protection
to emergency service workers, as a result of reports of assaults by members of the public during emergency call-outs.
Bryant introduced the Assaults on Emergency Workers (Offences) Bill 2017-19. This bill was greatly strengthened by
the evidence of public support, and was one of the few Private Members’ Bills supported by the Government. Tweets
during the passage of the Bill through Parliament used the hashtag #ProtectTheProtectors, and received a high level of
engagement. On 13 September 2018, the Bill received Royal Assent, the final stage on the way to becoming a law. It
is now been signed into law as the Assaults on Emergency Workers (Offences) Act 2018.
This innovative approach, and the effective use of Twitter, surveys and hashtags has enabled the public to follow
the progress of the Bill throughout its timeline and participate by providing direct comments, creating an experience
closer to direct democracy [21]. It has also acted as a means of garnering publicity for Bryant. We can relate this case
back to the three research questions: RQ-1 and RQ-2 seek to understand how much load is incurred by the MPs, and
how they manage this load. Clearly, with 45,000 responses to the initial survey, this was a huge effort. The use of a
survey tool was critical to manage this huge load and summarise their response. However, the MP also struggled to
cope: Analysis of Tweets during the survey/poll in July 2017 reveals a typical pattern of activity during a focus period
(Fig. 10). Twitter users mentioned the MP (in red), often to make suggestions or enter into dialogue, but as shown by
the blue line, he was unable to respond to many. This showcases both the potential for direct and participatory online
engagement via Twitter but also the drawbacks, if excessive activity makes a personal response impracticable.
To study RQ-3 on the nature and tone of the discussion, we focus on the final day of high activity during the passage
of the Bill. Fig. 9 shows that the MP gained more than 500 mentions on just one day (Sep 13), when the Royal
Assent was obtained. With a high number of mentions like this on a single day, it is hard to respond to each mention;
reiterating again that although the process innovatively unlocked the participatory potential of Twitter, the burden of
response during such direct engagement remains an issue (RQ1). To manage the load, the MP did a ‘thank you’ post
as a collective response to all (RQ2). As an event where high attention was anticipated, the messages were mostly
appreciative and complementary to the MP16. Although as expected the majority of congratulatory Tweets were from
Labour supporters, it is remarkable that close to 28% of tweets come from non-Labour supporters, showing the broad
multi-partisan support for the Bill, offering hope for constructive participatory democracy through the innovative use
of digital tools like Twitter.
7 Discussion and further work
As early as 1774, the political philosopher and MP Edmund Burke stressed the importance of understanding the views
of constituents [39]. Despite this early recognition of its need, active engagement with constituents outside the election
period was rare until the mid-twentieth century [31]. However, it is now seen as a necessity by MPs, and this is being
increasingly facilitated through digital means.
Our research agenda involves understanding the usage of Twitter as a new form of continuous citizen engagement.
In this work, we identified Twitter as an interactive platform which seems to have become part of mainstream usage,
used by nearly all MPs, and with a high volume of activity. We investigated the dynamics of the load imposed by the
increasing volumes of Twitter activity and the consequent attention directed towards MPs. We showed that attention
15https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RqkSSQ3bAaA
16The volume of the whole conversation from July 2017–Sep 2018 permits only a cursory examination, but also seems to incorporate a mostly civil and respectful
tone; with suggestions and requests for changes, inquiries as to why the bill is required when assault by itself is already considered a crime, as well as messages of
encouragement.
17https://services.parliament.uk/bills/2017-19/assaultsonemergencyworkersoffences.html
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Figure 9: Left:#ProtectTheProtector tweets burst on the day of Bill getting passed in House of Commons. Right: Status
of the Bill17s on 15th Sep 2018.
Figure 10: Left: Survey tweet links, MP Chris Bryant ⇒ and ⇐ Right: MP Chris Bryant’s thanking video after his
proposed bill was passed the Committee stage.
can be highly focussed, with a large proportion of the total activity directed at an MP occurring during short focus
periods of 3–5 days. MPs use selective replies and prioritisation of local or constituents’ concerns as a way to manage
this high attention load. They use their Twitter presence strategically, balancing their role as party representatives
with the role of hearing and responding to their citizens’ needs. We also find that Twitter presents possibilities for
immediate and direct discussion, leading to new possibilities for cross-party discussions on a level playing field and
therefore holds promise for bridging, or at least initiating conversations, across the political divide.
However, there is additional work to be done. For instance, despite its current widespread use, there still remain some
concerns about how representative Twitter is, as a (or the main) platform for digital citizen engagement. Furthermore,
we need to go beyond the current observational study, to conclusively understand whether Twitter engagement is
helping MPs in their day-to-day duties or if it merely adds to their burdens. Other questions – such as whether Twitter
remains a place for “empty” conversations, or whether actual Government or Parliamentary activity result from these
online discussions – need closer scrutiny. Case studies such as the creation of the Assaults on Emergency Workers
(Offences) Act 2018 point to ways in which Parliamentary activity can be facilitated or directed through Twitter and
other online means, but these are early examples, and there may be other mechanisms that become more commonplace
in the near future. In this context, it may be interesting to compare with other more formal routes, including e-petitions,
which can get discussed in parliament if sufficient numbers of citizens declare interest in an issue.
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